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The Power of Proximity:  
Strategic Decisions in African Party Politics 
Abstract 
Recent publications suggest that exclusively ethnoregional parties are as rare in sub-
Saharan Africa as elsewhere. At the same time, the idea that ethnicity is a very special fea-
ture of African party politics persists. The paper acknowledges the general relevance of 
ethnicity in party competition but emphasizes the level on which it becomes important. It 
develops a microbehavioral approach which pays particular attention to the strategic 
choices of party elites in order to supplement the dominant structuralist thinking in party 
research on Africa. An in-depth evaluation of detailed election data from Burkina Faso 
shows that strategies which rely on personal proximity between the voter and the candi-
dates influence the parties’ success to a great extent. Parties maximize their chances of 
winning seats if they concentrate their limited resources on the home localities of leading 
party members. Hence, African party politics are less dependent on ethnic demography 
than is often implied but more open to change through elite behavior. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Macht der Nähe:  
Zu strategischen Entscheidungen in afrikanischen Parteien 
Die neuere Literatur legt nahe, dass exklusive ethnoregionale Parteien im subsaharischen 
Afrika ähnlich selten sind wie andernorts. Zugleich besteht die Vorstellung fort, dass 
Ethnizität für afrikanische Parteiensysteme besonders wichtig sei. Dieser Beitrag stellt des-
halb nicht die grundsätzliche Bedeutung von Ethnizität im Parteienwettbewerb in Frage, 
sondern widmet sich der spezifischen gesellschaftlichen Ebene, auf der Ethnizität wichtig 
wird. Der hier entwickelte mikrobehaviorale Ansatz, der strategischen Entscheidungen 
von Parteieliten besondere Beachtung schenkt, soll die vorherrschende strukturalistische 
Herangehensweise der Parteienforschung zu Afrika ergänzen. Eine exemplarische Unter-
suchung detaillierter Wahldaten aus Burkina Faso zeigt, dass Strategien, die auf der per-
sönlichen Nähe zwischen Wähler und Kandidat aufbauen, den Parteierfolg stark beein-
flussen. Parteien maximieren ihre Wahlchancen, wenn sie ihre begrenzten Ressourcen auf 
die Heimatorte führender Parteimitglieder konzentrieren. Infolgedessen ist der afrikani-
sche Parteienwettbewerb weit weniger an die ethnische Demographie gebunden als häufig 
unterstellt wird, sondern durch Elitenverhalten wandlungsfähig. 
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1 Introduction1
Due to the improved availability of adequate survey data, several recent publications have 
challenged the most popular approach to African party politics, one which assumes that 
ethnic structures play a determining role in party success. However, the degree of rejection 
of the ethnic argument varies significantly (see Lindberg and Morrison 2008 vs. Fridy 2007,2 
Basedau and Stroh 2008a, Erdmann 2007a, Erdmann 2007b, McLaughlin 2007). Thus, ethnic-
ity is not being abandoned as an influential factor; yet, the way it is looked at must obvi-
ously be refined. The observation that people are more likely to vote regionally than ethni-
cally, as discussed in detail elsewhere (Basedau and Stroh 2008a), has inspired a review of 
the idea that African voters act parochially rather than tribally (Bienen 1971: 200, similarly 
Bailey 1963: 136-157).3
                                                     
1  Reasearch for this paper was part of a research project which has been directed by Matthias Basedau and fun-
ded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). I am grateful to Andreas Mehler, Matthias Basedau and 
Martin Beck for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
2  Analyzing the Ghanaian case, Lindberg and Morrison conclude that ethnically predisposed voting is a minor 
feature, while Fridy insists that ethnicity is an extremely significant factor (Lindberg and Morrison 2008: 34; 
Fridy 2007: 302). 
3  The term is borrowed from Almond and Verba’s definition of parochial political culture (Almond and Verba 
1963). 
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What is an appropriate approach to African party politics? How can we better explain party 
success in order to counterbalance the weaknesses of macrostructural ethnoregionalism? 
The article proposes to draw on actor-oriented approaches to party politics such as electoral 
clientelism (Weingrod 1968, Lemarchand 1972, Barkan and Okumu 1978, Wantchékon 2003), 
the personalization of parties (Sandbrook 1996, Monga 1999, Chabal and Daloz 1999, 
Manning 2005), and rational behavioralism (Strøm 1990, Harmel and Janda 1994). The idea 
here is that the strategic exploitation of personal proximity between voters and politicians in 
rural Africa is of supreme importance. This implies the need for an approach which links 
candidates’ individual features with a more “micro” perspective on the geographic space of 
operation. The hypothesis reads that strong incentives push political party elites in Africa 
towards selective local mobilization in order to successfully attain assembly seats—or even 
executive office. The most resource-efficient way to do so is by concentrating activities on 
particular geographic units. Regional concentration is, thus, not necessarily a sign of eth-
noregional interest promotion, but rather of rational success maximization by goal-seeking 
parties (cf. Strøm 1990). The use of ethnic appeal on the microsocial level expresses, thus, 
more of a strategic elite decision than a sociostructural automatism. 
Research on the ethnic character of African party systems is inspired by macrosociological 
cleavage theory on voting behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967b). The affiliation to one social 
group is connected to a preference for one particular party. This implies a certain stability 
and automatism between the macrosociological structure of societies (e.g., ethnic demogra-
phy) and the emergence of parties which, presumably, defend the interests of their social 
groups, even though scholars would rarely claim a one-to-one translation of social struc-
tures into the political party system. 
Most often, structural approaches assume that ethnic groups mainly settle in one geographic 
region and that ethnoregional belonging determines support for political parties. While 
some countries seem to confirm this approach, in a number of African countries macrostruc-
tural approaches cannot sufficiently explain voting behavior. In some countries, empirical 
findings demonstrate that, first, region and ethnic affiliation are not congruent and, second, 
voting intentions are better explained by regional residence than ethnic self-ascription. Thus, 
geographic proximity also appears to be a crucial determinant of voting behavior. However, 
this article will argue that geographic regions as defined in most studies depict overly large 
entities. Or, conversely, proximity matters on a more local level. Ethnicity cannot be aban-
doned as a political factor in Africa. But given the structurally heterogeneous voting behav-
ior which we measure in some states, such as Burkina Faso, we need to ask what exactly the 
mechanism is which makes ethnic appeal relevant for voting behavior. 
Hence, I propose an approach which focuses on the strategic microbehavior of African par-
ties. It concentrates on the proximity of candidates to their voters. Empirical evidence from 
Burkina Faso, where cleavage theory cannot explain apparently unsystematic voting pat-
terns, supports the utility of this approach. 
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The paper proceeds in four sections. Firstly, the discussion of three common approaches 
(macrostructuralism, electoral clientelism, behavioralism) leads to the development of a 
fourth, microbehavioral, approach. Subsequently, a four-stage analytical framework opera-
tionalizes the theoretical idea of this last approach. Thirdly, the selection of Burkina Faso as 
an adequate case study is justified, before empirical evidence from the Burkinabè example is 
used to test the utility of the approach. The utility test, which consists of a multistep analy-
sis, is based on a comparison of detailed election data and information on the behavior and 
features of party leaders. The article concludes, fourthly, with comments on the generaliza-
bility of the findings and some theoretical implications. 
2 Four Approaches 
Macrostructuralism and Ethnoregional Cleavages 
Political scientists and the general public commonly approach the success of political parties 
in sub-Saharan Africa using sociostructural explanations. Besides the structuralist view 
which is discussed in this subsection, there are at least two other mainstream approaches 
which are relevant in the African context. These focus less on greater social structures than 
on the relationships and behavior of individuals. They are discussed in the following subsec-
tions and finally consolidated into a fourth approach. This last model is subsequently ap-
plied to the case of Burkina Faso. 
The central idea of a macrostructuralist approach is that voters gather in common macroso-
ciological groups which are structured by social cleavages. According to the classical cleav-
age theory, these historically grown structures of society determine voting behavior. Due to 
the socioeconomic development and religious history of African societies, European cleav-
ages such as “workers vs. employers/owners” or “church(es) vs. government” (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967a: 14f) cannot contribute significantly to the explanation of voting preferences 
across Africa. Early perceptions of post-colonial Africa influenced the analysis of multiparty 
competition in African societies for a long period of time, leading to an emphasis on “eth-
noregional” cleavages instead (Erdmann and Weiland 2001). Mainly based on crucial exam-
ples of ethnic parties—sometimes explicitly referring to their ethnic basis4—and ventures of 
ethnoregional separatism, as in Biafra and Katanga, influential contributions stress the dan-
gers of “tribalism,” articulated in multiparty elections as a result of ethnic cleavages 
(Emerson 1966, Wallerstein 1967). 
The ethnoregional approach to African party politics is therefore a subset of cleavage theory, 
but one strongly influenced by conflict research and not by scholars of party politics 
                                                     
4  Giving only two prominent examples, I refer to the parties of Dahomey’s first president, Hubert Maga, called 
Groupement Ethnique du Nord-Dahomey (GEND, cf. Staniland 1973), and of Rwanda’s first president, 
Grégoire Kayibanda, called Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu (Parmehutu, cf. Philipp 1978). 
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(Horowitz 1985, Calhoun 1993). Ethnic groups living predominantly in particular regions 
have continuously been promulgated as a typical determinant of African party systems 
(Widner 1997, van de Walle and Butler 1999, Ottaway 1999, Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005). In-
terestingly, the most elaborate concept of ethnoregional parties is based on the European 
experience (cf. De Winter and Türsan 1998, Schrijver 2004). This concept relies on two crite-
ria: First, ethnoregional parties are basically supported by one ethnic group which is concen-
trated in one geographic region, such as Spain’s Basque country or Belgium’s Wallonia. Sec-
ond, ethnoregional parties are policy-seeking parties which represent the minority interests 
of their ethnoregional group within the political arena. Both conditions cause severe prob-
lems with regard to an application to sub-Saharan Africa. 
On the one hand, sub-Saharan populations today are often ethnically mixed. Incomplete, old 
databases impede systematic control.5 Regional election data, which are often employed for 
relevant studies (e.g., Crook 1997, Scarritt 2006, Elischer 2008), cannot prove the congruence 
of ethnic population shares (as far as they are available) or assumed ethnic majorities (which 
is rather the rule) with voting behavior. But recent empirical findings based on national sur-
vey polls confirm the incongruence of regional residence and ethnic affiliation and give rise 
to doubts about the general importance of ethnic affiliation for party support (Lindberg and 
Morrison 2008, Erdmann 2007a, Basedau and Stroh 2008a, McLaughlin 2007). Nobody would 
deny some degree of geographic concentration of members of ethnic groups within ethnically 
heterogeneous countries. However, this often occurs at a level lower than that of politically 
relevant geographic units. In other words, while ethnic homogeneity in a particular village 
can be the rule, it may be the exception at the level of electoral constituencies. Moreover, sub-
national administrative units are often better predictors of voting intentions than ethnic af-
filiations (Basedau and Stroh 2008a). Thus, many Africans tend to align with their local 
neighbors rather than with their fellow “tribesmen” in other parts of the country. Nonethnic 
regional cleavages are usually difficult to justify theoretically, particularly if there is no obvi-
ous divide such as, for instance, the north/south rivalry in West Africa’s coastal states. 
On the other hand, ethnic or regionalist parties are legally banned in most African countries 
in order to avoid ethnic conflicts (Becher and Basedau 2008). Thus we cannot expect parties 
to openly conduct their electoral campaigns on the basis of ethnoregional interests, either 
because the elites who established the relevant rules really value the prohibition of ethnic 
campaigning or because they conceal it.6 Both problems suggest the necessity of a search for 
alternative explanations. 
                                                     
5  The lack of data is often a consequence of a deliberate political decision. Many African countries avoid statis-
tics on ethnic affiliations due to the risk of conflict presumably related to the topic. 
6  Systematic studies on actual campaigning methods are very rare. One exception is Mayrargue’s study explor-
ing the electoral rhetoric in the case of Benin (Mayrargue 2004). 
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Microsociological Alignment and Electoral Clientelism 
A second approach is based on a microsociological phenomenon: clientelism. Lemarchand 
distinguishes clientelism from ethnicity by describing the first as a (microsociological) indi-
vidual linkage and ethnicity as a (macrosociological) group phenomenon (Lemarchand 1972: 
83). This distinction is only loosely connected to the microsociological approach in Western 
party research, also known as the Columbia School, which argues that a person’s social 
characteristics determine his or her political preference (Lazarsfeld et al. 1968: 27). Individ-
ual ethnic identities—which are subject to ascription and change (Lemarchand 1972: 69, 
Lentz 1995)—are one possible feature in this sense. However, a simplistic nexus between 
ethnic affiliation and party preferences has already been rejected, regardless of whether it is 
micro- or macrosociologically justified. 
Instead of being a one-sided examination of voters, electoral clientelism is a theory of net-
working and individual dependencies. Clientelism establishes a mutual commitment be-
tween two individuals. Scholars thus emphasized this feature when they conceptualized 
the ideal-typical “big man” (Mines and Gourishankar 1990, Médard 1992, Bratton and van 
de Walle 1997, Weingrod 1968). The motivations which produce this special dyadic rela-
tionship between patrons and clients can build on various incentives. Some scholars em-
phasize the continuous and asymmetric dependency which favors the patron (Rouquié 
1978). Others promote the idea of a basically voluntary relationship (Spittler 1977). The 
more elections become competitive, the more relevance voluntariness gains in electoral cli-
entelism, since the voter has the opportunity to change his patron at the ballot box (cf. 
Barkan and Okumu 1978). 
Only if clientelistic relations become communal—in other words, a reciprocal relationship 
between a committing person and a specific group (of voters)—do Erdmann and Engel call 
it “patronage” (Erdmann and Engel 2007).7 Consequently, participation in patronage net-
works may be very rational in the eyes of a voter who has mainly parochial material inter-
ests due to his personal limits in time, space, and imagination. This voter would evaluate the 
candidate’s political potency by weighing his earlier performance (especially direct material 
service delivery) and his capability to put pressure on higher political levels to support the 
local sphere. Since information is usually incomplete, rational evaluation may be supple-
mented by factors such as trust in a person who is socially close to the group to which the 
voter himself belongs (Erdmann and Engel 2007: 107). 
In a less systematic understanding of patronage, political parties are seen as mere power ve-
hicles for individual members of the elite (Monga 1999, Manning 2005, Sandbrook 1996, 
Randall 2005) or simply “extensions of individual politicians” (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 151). 
This concept of political parties implies similar relations of politicians to the electorate: clien-
                                                     
7  I prefer their differentiation to other definitions of the term which emphasize an exploitation of state re-
sources in defining patronage (Warner 1997). 
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telism and electoral corruption (direct material benefits, vote buying) are widely inter-
woven. However, this approach does not sufficiently clarify the durability of the connection 
(Beck 2008: 3-11). 
In contrast to macrostructural approaches, these microsociological approaches, which use 
the paradigm of clientelism, conceive of sociological group identities such as ethnic affilia-
tions as a means to an end and not as an original cause of voting behavior. However, this 
approach also bears two main problems. First, while the conception of electoral clientelism 
in its classical form (long-term dependencies, fixed pyramids of patron-client networks) is 
much too static to explain the relatively high volatility of voting behavior in many African 
countries (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005, Bogaards 2008), the conception of political entrepre-
neurs who build and buy their clientelistic networks of voters is too random to explain the 
long-standing success of an important number of party organizations on the continent 
(Bogaards 2008, Basedau and Stroh 2008c). Second, individual clientelism excludes collective 
coordination or cooperation within a party organization. However, we will see later that 
smaller parties can particularly benefit from strategic collective action. This method is far 
from incompatible with electoral clientelism. Collective actors may circumvent the arduous 
promotion channels for individuals in ideal-typical clientelist networks and more rapidly at-
tain a direct link to the top “big man” (chief patron), who is usually the president of the re-
public in Africa’s political systems (van de Walle 2003, cf. Figure 1). At the same time, we 
must pay attention to the fact that not every pyramidal hierarchy is necessarily a clientelistic 
network. The possibility of circumventing the pyramid weakens the concept and demands 
theoretical alternatives or supplements. 
Figure 1: Electoral Clientelism and Collective Party Strategies 
(a) Classical Electoral Clientelism (b) Organized Circumvention 
Source: Figure (a) based on Barkan and Okumu 1978, p. 98; Figure (b), author’s adaptation. 
Behavioralism and Party Organizations 
The modern behavioralist theory of party success takes the existence of collective actors for 
granted. Accordingly, political parties are expected to develop rational strategies: they 
evaluate and concentrate their powers in order to achieve particular goals. The canon of 
goals includes policies, offices, and votes (Strøm 1990, Harmel and Janda 1994). This ap-
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proach is theoretically very compatible with concepts of ethnoregionalism as well as clientel-
ism. If the main objective of a party is the promotion of the interests of one ethnic group or 
an exclusive ethnic alliance, we are dealing with a primarily policy-seeking party. The pre-
ferred policy is namely one of ethnic privilege. According to an electoral clientelism ap-
proach, parties are mainly office-seeking.8 Office and seats promise access to resources 
which voters (clients) expect will be redistributed individually. 
The behavioralist theory emphasizes the rationality of collective action in order to attain the 
respective goal. The focus on organizations certainly risks underestimating the relative 
weakness of political parties and the power of individual linkages in African contexts. How-
ever, it brings organizations back into the analysis and suggests the need for a closer exami-
nation of party strategies. So, how do parties deal with the structural conditions they face? 
Moreover, the focus on organizations on the supply side of elections (political parties) dis-
tinguishes this rational approach from rational choice models outlining the voting decisions 
of individual voters. The basic idea of political economists such as Downs and Key is that 
“voters are no fools” and that they therefore evaluate which political competitor best corre-
sponds to their own interests (Downs 1957, Key 1966). Almost needless to say, this general 
assumption is easily acceptable with regard to the demand side (voters), though within 
some structural boundaries (e.g., level of education and information). However, contrary to 
party behavioralism, it neglects the supply side. A voter cannot choose among options 
which have never been available. The political offering can be restricted due to a lack of 
freedom of competition or due to deliberate decisions of political competitors. The latter 
point is emphasized in the following, fourth approach. 
Microbehavioral Strategies of Localization 
This fourth approach attempts to consolidate the microsociological and behavioral ap-
proaches in order to supplement the macrostructural approach. Since it is obviously the 
supply side of sub-Saharan party politics which has been widely neglected in the past, this 
approach focuses on the options voters have rather than on the choices they make. 
Since there is no adequate data on strategy-making procedures within African parties, we 
need to predict the most likely strategy. The theories of electoral clientelism and behavioral-
ism help in developing the central hypothesis of the approach, which reads as follows: Afri-
can political parties are collective actors in which party elites develop and coordinate strate-
gies of localization. The emerging pattern of local mobilization largely depends on a party’s 
financial and human resources. Thus, the geographic concentration of party success be-
comes mainly a question of resource efficiency, and appeals to ethnic kinship become a 
question of the locally exploitable features of the individual candidates available to the 
party. Consequently, the regional patterns of the national party system depend significantly 
                                                     
8  Deviating from Strøm and others, assembly seats are included in the definition of “office.” 
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on elite decisions (supply side of competition) and are less determined by ethnic interests 
(demand side) than macrostructuralism suggests. 
The contribution of actor-oriented approaches is the following. Clientelism points to the im-
portance of individual relations between voters and candidates. Leaving the feudal connota-
tion of clientelism aside, we may say that it appears rational if voters support a patron-like 
politician who is an honorable member of the local community. Since voters have the oppor-
tunity to exchange this “elected patron” with the next ballot, a concept which stresses the 
qualifications of the candidate more than permanent dependency is needed. This is what 
Bako-Arifari described for Benin by using the popular French term “fils du terroir” (literally 
“son of the soil,” Bako-Arifari 1995, cf. also Weiner 1978).9 Two circumstances support this 
kind of rationality. Firstly, rural voters in Africa usually have limited access to information 
about political alternatives. Secondly, precarious living conditions push people to focus on 
their basic local needs. In other words, they are more inclined to rational behavior which fol-
lows parochial material interests instead of accentuating abstract ethnic affiliation (Bienen 
1971: 200, Bailey 1963: 136-157). Moreover, party candidates must possess the capacity to 
campaign in a very practical manner: they should speak one or more of the local languages. 
Since there is virtually no systematic training for intra-national “alien” languages in most 
sub-Saharan countries, being a “son of the soil” significantly facilitates this task. The first 
lesson for political parties should thus be to run “fils du terroir” as their candidates in order 
to meet the parochial interests of the electorate. 
Clientelism defines the requirements for an individual candidate; behavioralism then brings 
in the party organization. African parties have long been described as electoral machines 
(Bailey 1963, Bienen 1971) which virtually disappear between elections (Fomunyoh 2001: 48). 
Seen in a positive way, this at least means that they appear as collective actors during elec-
toral periods. However, due to their apparent and sometimes obvious weakness, a system-
atic analysis of their strategic behavior has not been seen as relevant. Behavioralist theory 
suggests classifying electoral machines as office-seeking parties which try to win assembly 
seats and offices through minimal efforts during election periods. Accordingly, the second 
lesson for political parties is that success largely depends on an efficient allocation of finan-
cial and human resources during election periods. 
In consideration of these lessons, the most rational strategy for parties is one of localization 
based on a mixture of assessments of the chances to win seats, an efficient allocation of fi-
nancial resources, and studiously fielded “fils du terroir.” This contribution will concentrate 
on the aspect of personal proximity in order to test the overall utility of the approach. We 
will keep the other factors in mind and use them in the case of inconsistencies with regard to 
                                                     
9  Bako-Arifari, himself obviously a connoisseur of the art of localizing political competition, was elected to par-
liament in 2007. However, since he avoided systematic inquiry and international comparison, he blamed this 
mechanism for being at the root of the weakness of political parties in Benin instead of discussing its general 
effects on party competition in Africa. 
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the proximity feature. Many parties, for instance, are not capable of engaging in territory-
wide competition due to human and financial resource scarcity. Thus, they need to concen-
trate their activities on selected constituencies.10 Besides the availability of “sons of the soil” 
(human resources), for instance, the amount of funds for travel expenses can influence a 
party’s localization strategy.11 Geographic concentration on particular regions or where 
there is good transport infrastructure avoids the inefficient use of financial resources. 
3 Analytical Framework 
How can we systematically test the utility of the microbehavioral approach? First of all, we 
need to detect the geographic positioning of party success and failure. Are there “regional-
ist” parties? Do parties concentrate on one particular region and willfully neglect others in 
order to represent (ethno)regional interests? Do parties follow a strategy of localization by 
seeking office in a resource-efficient way? How do they incorporate their human resources? 
All these questions are addressed using a four step analytical framework which relies on 
disaggregated electoral results. The framework includes the development of some require-
ments which a suitable case for an exploratory utility test should meet. 
First Step: “Regionalization” or Uneven Distribution? 
Jones and Mainwaring measure the “nationalization” of political parties (Jones and Main-
waring 2003). In their understanding a “nationalized” party is a party with a support base 
which is equally distributed across the country. They imply that the opposite of their under-
standing of nationalization is “regionalization,”12 which appears to be a good proxy for 
comparing the overall level of regionalization of different parties. However, the actual op-
posite of the nationalization score is uneven distribution. The score neglects the geographic 
positions of electoral strongholds, whereas the term regionalization intuitively suggests the 
concentration of a party in one particular geographic region. A true regionalist party is not 
expected to possess strongholds in totally different corners of a given country, but to defend 
regional interests. This is why the distribution score must be supplemented with a mapping 
                                                     
10  A large majority of African electoral systems provide for single-member or small-sized constituencies (see 
Nohlen 2007). 
11  A study of party financing practices recently showed that African party officials most often declare transpor-
tation as the single largest item in campaign expenditures (Bryan and Baer 2005: 15). 
12  Jones and Mainwaring calculate the Gini coefficient of votes in geographic regions, that is, the degree of un-
equal distribution of party support across a given country, in order to identify the nationwide rooting of par-
ties (Jones and Mainwaring 2003, for an application to an African case see Elischer 2008). Since the coefficient 
varies between zero and one, with rising values indicating increasing inequality, they subtract it from one in 
order to reach a value of one indicating the highest degree of nationalization. I will simply use the Gini coef-
ficient to measure “non-nationalization”; that is, the higher the Gini value, the higher the degree of uneven 
distribution of support across the country. 
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of strongholds. For this purpose, a stronghold is defined as a constituency (or relevant vote-
counting unit) where a party receives more than double its average vote share. 
High distribution scores plus geographic concentration would indicate regionalist parties 
and therefore support the macrosociological approach. High scores plus geographic decon-
centration would, in contrast, support the microbehavioral approach. High nationalization 
scores for all major parties would challenge both approaches. In order to make the distribu-
tion score more precise, a suitable test case should thus be one with geographically small 
electoral constituencies. Additionally, an ideal test case would be one in which ethnic 
groups are clearly geographically mixed in order not to confound ethnic affiliation with 
geographic residence. 
Second Step: Refining Concentration Patterns with Local Electoral Data 
With the help of electoral data from the communal level, the analysis should identify more 
confined strongholds, record their geographic distribution, and compare the results with the 
constituency level. While data from parliamentary elections serve best for the first step, this 
refinement procedure can employ locally disaggregated legislative results or data from mu-
nicipal elections.13
A concentration of local strongholds in specific regions where the regional support is gener-
ally above average would tend to support the macrosociological approach but not necessar-
ily contradict the emphasis on proximity. An apparently unsystematic dispersion of local 
strongholds across the country would contradict macrosociological expectations and, thus, 
further strengthen the utility of a microbehavioral approach, while evenly distributed local 
support bases would challenge both approaches. 
Third Step: Deliberate Electoral Participation and Nonparticipation of Parties 
The assessment tools used in steps one and two are ex post evaluations of voting decisions. 
Only by examining the pattern of geographic positioning are we able to come to any conclu-
sions about parties’ localization strategies. However, it is difficult to determine the precise 
degree of influence party action has on the vote, particularly without detailed data on the al-
location of campaign resources (frequency and location of rallies and canvassing, expendi-
tures for gadgets, etc.). The best alternative is to highlight electoral participation in the sense 
of the running of candidates. The data on where certain parties stand and do not stand for 
election is objective and officially available. Collective party action is assumed as long as a 
decision not to participate was taken deliberately. Given resource scarcity, the willful ne-
glect of particular areas and a resource-efficient concentration of activities should lead to a 
                                                     
13  If employing municipal ballots, we should pay attention to significant deviations in turnouts in order to mini-
mize the danger of incorrect conclusions from totally different electorates. However, a comparison with legis-
lative results should help in avoiding this trap. 
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greater success ratio. The more precisely localities appear to be selected, the more the find-
ings support the microbehavioral approach. On the contrary, ethnoregional parties should 
run their candidates across the main settlement area of their affiliated group without con-
cern for the balance of success. 
Accordingly, the third step evaluates the patterns of nonparticipation and their correlation 
with relative party success in those electoral districts where candidates have been nomi-
nated. A suitable test case should provide for the legal option of the selective running of 
candidates. That is, nominating candidates in several constituencies while not standing for 
election in several other constituencies must be allowed. Otherwise it would be necessary to 
attain a great deal of complex data on the scope and allocation of party resources; these are 
usually unavailable. 
Fourth Step: Measuring a Strategy of Personal Proximity 
Finally, we want to know more about the reasoning of parties. The previous steps can iden-
tify whether, at what level, and with what effect parties utilize a geographic focus. This last 
step detects the systematic decision making behind apparently unsystematic regional distri-
butions of party action and success. The microbehavioral approach suggests personal prox-
imity as the most efficient strategy in a parochial context. 
Thus, do voters appreciate “honorable local people”—in the sense of “sons of the soil”—
running for a party? This aspect of a strategy of localization is best evaluated by looking at 
the home localities of leading party representatives. Do parties focus on areas where they 
are able to run “fils du terroir”? Are parties more successful if they do so? Are other strategic 
factors capable of explaining deviations from the expected strategy of localization? 
The following scenario would again support the utility of the microbehavioral approach: A 
party is particularly successful where it manages to run important “sons of the soil,” while it 
deliberately neglects competition or fails in other constituencies—independent of their geo-
graphic position or of similar ethnic structures. By recalling electoral clientelism, which 
serves as one influential starting point of this approach, we would expect that a candidate’s 
relative importance in the political scene (level within hierarchy, office incumbency, access 
to resources, etc.) broadens his geographic range of appeal (cf. Barkan and Okumu 1978). In 
other words, the higher a “fils du terroir” rises in the clientelist pyramid, the larger the geo-
graphic area he is able to cover. Accordingly, the quality of this step’s results is highly de-
pendent on the availability of very detailed data on individual politicians, such as informa-
tion about their home districts, particular social roles, and public standing. 
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4 Applying the Approach to Burkina Faso 
Why Burkina Faso? 
Burkina Faso is a very suitable case since it fulfills the demands defined above, which are 
required in order to test the utility of a microbehavioral approach vis-à-vis structural eth-
noregionalism. There is no consistent information on the number of ethnic groups; however, 
the Mossi account for approximately half the population. They are still associated with the 
central part of Burkina Faso, although migration has led to the dispersal of many group 
members across the country, particularly to towns. Several other groups, roughly equal in 
size, come next. Their classical settlement areas encircle the central Plateau Mossi (mainly 
Lobi, Volta, Mandé, Fula, and Gurma peoples; roughly from the southwest to the east in a 
clockwise direction; cf. Ben Yahmed 2005: 76, Krings 2006: 32-48, Morrison et al. 1989: 680). 
Since different economic and social incentives for individual migration intersect with the 
different cultural histories of sedentary and nomadic groups, we should handle this general 
pattern with care. 
The 45 constituencies in the 2007 legislative elections were predominantly small (median = 2). 
Their geographic size permits a clear distinction from potential ethnoregional units. The nec-
essary data for the proposed multistep analysis is available through results from the munici-
pal elections in 2006. Turnout at the local polls was not particularly low.14 Furthermore, mul-
tivariate regression analyses using individual data show that in the case of Burkina Faso the 
regional variable is significant, while ethnic affiliation is virtually disqualified as a predictor 
of voting intentions (Basedau and Stroh 2008b). Most notably, there is no significant link be-
tween the Mossi majority and the electoral predominance of the Congrès pour la Démocratie 
et le Progrès (CDP). Party-specific analyses point to a comparably moderate regional effect, 
but regional residence still contributes much more to the explanation of party preferences 
than ethnic affiliation (Basedau and Stroh 2008a). That is to say, in Burkina Faso a general 
mechanism of localization should be clearly distinguishable from the macrosociological ef-
fects of ethnoregionalism, which appear to be inconclusive. 
Since the multistep analysis proposes tools that deal with individual parties, I have selected 
the most relevant parties from the Burkinabè party system. They include in each case the 
three largest parties in the 2002 and 2007 national assemblies as well as in a 2006 representa-
tive survey poll.15 This selection procedure generates a sample of five parties. These are the 
dominant ruling party CDP, the smaller presidential-movement party Union pour la Répu-
blique (UPR), the moderate opposition party Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération/ 
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (ADF/RDA), and two parties from the so-called ra-
                                                     
14  About 1.9 million people cast their votes, which is the same level as for parliamentary elections in 2002 and 
not too much behind the 2.26 million who participated in the 2007 parliamentary elections. 
15  Key data in Table A1 in the annex. The survey was conducted by the GIGA Institute of African Affairs and 
local partners in October 2006. Its 1,003 respondents were randomly chosen on the basis of a countrywide re-
gional stratification and gender equity. 
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dical opposition, namely, Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès / Parti Socialiste (PDP/PS) 
and Union pour la Renaissance / Mouvement Sankariste (UNIR/MS). 
CDP and ADF/RDA have always been among the three largest parties. PDP/PS was the 
country’s third-largest force in the last parliament (2002–07). UPR was founded during the 
last legislative term by ambitious MPs from the presidential camp and is the third-largest 
party in the current national assembly. UNIR/MS came out with respectable results in the 
last two elections, placing second in the 2005 presidential elections and ranking third in the 
survey poll.16 Because of the large power gap between the dominant CDP and its four se-
lected competitors, I will call the latter “major secondary parties.” 
First Step: Legislative Regionalization? 
At present, the electoral system of Burkina Faso provides for 45 provincial constituencies 
which proportionally attribute one to nine seats (an average of 2.1) to closed party lists with 
substitute candidates.17 Fifteen constituencies are single-member districts, which implies 
that the actual electoral system is equivalent to a simple plurality system. The degree of un-
even geographic distribution of votes calculated on the basis of provincial results varies 
across parties. Roughly, the Gini coefficient decreases considerably with an increase in a 
party’s national success. The dominant CDP shows the lowest degree of uneven distribu-
tion, at 35.2, followed by the country’s second political power, ADF/RDA, with 49.2. The 
remaining parties place as follows: 61.4 for UPR, 64.2 for PDP/PS, and 75.3 for UNIR/MS. 
However, the mathematically uneven distribution does not correspond to a geographic con-
centration of strongholds. Accordingly, we are not dealing with regionalization. I reiterate 
the definition of a stronghold: a district where the party wins at least double its average 
share of votes in all contested constituencies. According to this definition, the parties under 
review possess three to five provincial strongholds—except the CDP, which would need a 
120 percent share in a given province to fulfill the criteria. By joining the high measure of na-
tionalization (even distribution) with the general difficulty of identifying clear-cut strong-
holds, we can identify the dominant CDP as a true national party. This does not ignore the 
fact that the microbehavioral mechanism also works with CDP, but the secondary parties 
will be more helpful for the utility test. 
                                                     
16  There are several possible explanations as to why the survey results differ to a certain degree from the 2007 
election results. One is the strong effect of concentration of the Burkinabè electoral system used in 2007; a 
second is the short-term mobilization strategies which lower the predictive potential (which has never been a 
target) of chronologically distanced surveys; and a third might be a reluctance to vote even when citizens are 
clearly able to define their political will. If we estimate half of Burkina’s national population to be of legal age, 
turnout in the May 2007 polls was about 30 percent, while freely uttered voting intentions were measured at 
78.2 percent in the survey. 
17  Burkina Faso has changed its electoral law at each election. Due to discontent from the opposition, the elec-
toral law is again under discussion and will probably be amended before the next election in 2012. 
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Figure 2 locates the strongholds. It clearly unveils geographic dispersion independent from 
the degree of uneven distribution as measured before. Only two UPR stronghold constitu-
encies share a common border. Due to the effects of the electoral and party systems, parties 
do not necessarily win a seat in their stronghold. However, following the logic of macro-
structural ethnoregionalism, we should not expect parties to win seats in localities scattered 
across the national territory. PDP/PS and UNIR/MS won all of their few provincial seats 
within their strongholds, while UPR won half of its (few) provincial seats outside its strong-
holds. Finally, ADF/RDA won only two out of 12 seats within strongholds, and was not able 
to win a seat within its remaining three strongholds. The maps equally capture an obvious 
geographic deconcentration of any elevated vote shares (above-average provincial results), 
as well as provinces in which the parties did not stand for election at all. Moreover, the areas 
of strength of the different parties overlap. The national territory is not regionally divided 
between the parties, and there is no ethnic divide either (Basedau and Stroh 2008a, sup-
ported by a large number of expert interviews in Burkina Faso, realized in October and No-
vember 2006 as well as in April and August 2007). 
In sum, although abstract distribution scores indicate a low level of nationalization of party 
success, in political terms there is no systematic macroregional division of the national terri-
tory. However, parties do possess strongholds which appear to scatter unsystematically. 
Second Step: Municipal Concentration 
The territory of Burkina Faso is divided into 358 municipalities (districts or in French “com-
munes”), each of them pooling several villages or urban quarters. The size of the council as-
semblies ranges from 16 to 226 seats, with an average size of 50 councilors. Councilors are 
elected in small village constituencies. However, the generally large assembly size creates 
realistic chances for smaller parties to win seats. In order to get even closer to the concept of 
office-seeking parties18 and due to the large number of electoral units, this step uses seat 
shares instead of vote shares to define strongholds. 
Again, CDP is not represented since its general dominance obstructs any meaningful identi-
fication of strongholds. The average CDP seat share is 74.3 percent and it achieves above-
average results across the entire country. Thus, a focus on secondary parties’ strategies con-
tributes much more to the utility test. Even at first glance, Table 1 contraindicates clear-cut 
regionalism. The success of all parties is dispersed across the country, except for a certain 
concentration of UPR in the east (Boulgou, Gnagna, Kouritenga). This is, however, counter-
balanced in the greater west of Burkina Faso.19
                                                     
18  Strictly speaking, step one comes closer to the vote-seeking model. However, votes and office are not inde-
pendent from each other. This paper basically focuses on the difference between immediate resource-seeking 
goals (votes, seats, office) and abstract policy-seeking goals. 
19  For more detailed figures and a reference map see Figures A1 and A2 in the annex. 
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Figure 2: Mapping Legislative Strongholds and Nonparticipation of Secondary Parties in 
Burkina Faso 
ADF/RDA 
 
PDP/PS 
UNIR/MS UPR 
Key: Dark grey = provincial stronghold 
Light grey = result above the average for all contested provinces 
 = Member of Parliament (provincial constituencies) 
³ = province not contested 
Note: CDP excluded due to its dominant position (cf. p. 17) 
Source: Author’s representations (cartographic execution by Florian Weisser) on the basis of detailed electoral 
results from the 2007 legislative polls provided by CENI Burkina Faso (independent electoral commis-
sion). 
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Table 1: Electoral Performance of Secondary Parties by Province 
ADF/RDA PDP/PS UNIR/MS UPR Administrative  
Region 
Province 
Munic. 
2006 
Parl. 
2007 
Munic. 
2006 
Parl. 
2007 
Munic. 
2006 
Parl.  
2007 
Munic.  
2006 
Parl. 
2007 
Bale    o 1/10 -- x  o 
Banwa 1/6 - x  o  x o > 
Kossi    x o >  o 
Mouhoun 1/7 - >     1/7 + x 
Nayala 1/6 - x 1/6 +  o  o o 
Boucle du  
Mouhoun 
Sourou    o o > o  
Comoe   o    o o Cascades 
Leraba   o  o  o o 
Centre Kadiogo     2/11 + x   
Boulgou   1/13 -    4/13 ++ > 
Koulpelogo   o o o  o  
Centre-Est 
Kouritenga   2/9 - > 1/9 - > 2/9 + x 
Bam 4/9 - >  o 1/9 --  o  
Namentenga 4/8 - > 1/8 + > o    
Centre-Nord 
Sanmatenga 2/11 - > 1/11 -- x o   > 
Boulkiemde 2/15 - >  o     
Sanguie 2/10 - > 1/10 -  o  o  
Sissili   o o  > o  
Centre-Ouest 
Ziro 1/6 -  o o 1/6 --  1/6 --  
Bazega  > o o     
Nahouri  x 1/5 - x o  o  
Centre-Sud 
Zoundweogo 4/7 - > o o o   > 
Gnagna 2/7 - > 2/7 + >   2/7 ++ x 
Gourma 1/6 -- >     o  
Komondjari   o o o  o  
Kompienga 1/3 + x 1/3 - o o  o  
Est 
Tapoa   1/8 -- o o o o o 
Houet 7/16 -     > 1/16 + > 
Kenedougou   o o o  o > 
Hauts-Bassins 
Tuy    o o >  > 
Loroum 1/4 ++ > o o  > o o 
Passore   2/9 - > 2/9 + x o > 
Yatenga 6/13 ++ >   1/13 --  o o 
Nord 
Zondoma 4/5 -- >    > o o 
Ganzourgou   o o o  o  
Kourweogo    o  > o x 
Plateau Central 
Oubritenga   o o o o o  
Oudalan    o o  o o 
Seno   o o o  o  
Soum 2/9 - > 1/9 -- o   o o 
Sahel 
Yagha   o o o  o  
Bougouriba 2/5 + x o  o  o  
Ioba 1/8 - > 2/8 -- >     
Noumbiel 1/5 - >  o o  o o 
Sud-Ouest 
Poni 3/10 -  o o 1/10 -- >  o 
Lower stronghold margin 20.8 % 24.2 % 10.1 % 9.8 % 10.8 % 6.2 % 31.7 % 11.0 % 
Absolute number of strongholds 53 5 17 3 10 4 11 4 
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Key: Munic. = municipal elections 
Parl. = parliamentary elections  
n/m = n municipal strongholds out of m districts in a given province 
x = stronghold in parliamentary elections 
o = no electoral participation (in none of the provincial districts or no provincial list at the parliamentary polls) 
++ = average seat share in non-stronghold districts of the same province above the average of all contested districts 
+ = above the national average 
- = below the national average 
-- = at best one seat won in surrounding districts of the same province 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from CENI Burkina Faso. 
Municipal strongholds are scattered across a large number of administrative regions. They 
are not totally congruent with legislative strongholds. Depending on the party, the areas of 
strength overlap to a variable degree. The most nationalized secondary party according to 
step one, ADF/RDA, maintains the highest consistency. In three out of 22 cases only, those 
provinces where it had municipal strongholds in 2006 failed to yield above-average results 
in the 2007 parliamentary polls. The same is true of three out of eight provinces as regards 
UNIR/MS and one of six provinces for UPR. However, PDP/PS alone accounts for half of all 
similar cases in this sample, which means that the party failed to maintain strongholds in six 
out of 13 provinces. PDP/PS is also the only party in the sample which abandoned provinces 
(three) in the parliamentary elections although it had achieved stronghold results in local 
polls one year before. 
So far, data from different geographic levels confirm the utility of going more local with the 
analysis, since party success is neither concentrated macroregionally nor evenly distributed 
in the sense of true national parties. Step three must deepen the discussion on participation 
strategies in order to generate a better understanding of the persistence and dynamics of 
party success patterns. 
Third Step: Patterns of Strategic Participation and Neglect 
The approach implies that a party which is implementing a strategy of localization con-
sciously chooses particularly promising localities for competition and willfully neglects oth-
ers. Possibly, the most promising constituencies are situated within one larger region. 
Still drawing on information from the previous step, we find that all selected parties are repre-
sented in councils across the country. There is no strong pattern of regionalization in Burkina 
Faso (again, see Table 1 and cf. Figure A1 in the annex). Accordingly, ballot participation is ob-
viously scattered across the country. ADF/RDA and CDP contested 280 and all local council 
elections, respectively, in all 45 provinces. PDP/PS concentrated on 106 municipalities in 29 
provinces across 12 of 13 regions. UNIR/MS competed for 65 councils—that is, less than 20 per-
cent of all municipalities—but scattered across 23 provinces in all administrative regions. UPR 
contested 70 local ballots in 17 provinces of 9 regions (see Table 2). Hence, UPR employed the 
most concentrated strategy, but still dispersed competition and success to very different areas. 
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Table 2: Concentration of Competition 
 ADF/RDA CDP PDP/PS UNIR/MS UPR 
Number of local council entries vs.  
contested elections 175/280 356/358 51/106 37/65 50/70 
Ratio participation against entry 62.5 % 99.4 % 48.1 % 56.9 % 71.4 % 
Share of contested districts 78.2 % 100.0 % 29.6 % 18.2 % 19.6 % 
Local council entry vs. electoral  
participation in n provinces 41/45 45/45 24/29 18/23 15/17 
Local council entry vs. electoral 
participation in n administrative regions 13/13 13/13 10/12 12/13 9/9 
Average seat share where part of the  
council 16.7 % 74.3 % 10.5 % 9.5 % 22.2 % 
Number of seats in local councils 1,546 12,843 310 155 600 
Number of absolute majorities in local  
councils 6 311 0 1 8 
Source: Author’s compilation on the basis of data from CENI Burkina Faso. 
Generally, we find 91 municipal strongholds of secondary parties in total. A large majority 
of strongholds (63 units or 69.2 percent) are situated in provinces where the respective 
party’s average results in all remaining non-stronghold districts is below its national aver-
age. Hence, more than two-thirds of all strongholds are located in political environments of 
below-average performance. 
The effect of the party’s deliberate decisions becomes most visible in those 16 strongholds 
which are situated in provinces where the given party is (virtually)20 nonexistent outside the 
stronghold district(s). To run there was a deliberate, and presumably strategic, choice by the 
respective parties, since they did not even present themselves in 69 out of 79 surrounding 
districts, that is, in other non-stronghold districts within the same province. Thus, we may 
call these 16 cases “island strongholds.” 
Indeed, we apparently are not dealing with geographic concentration in the sense of inter-
est representation, but rather in the sense of a rational party strategy of office-seeking elites. 
However, the visibility of this effect certainly decreases with the increasing nationalization 
of a party and with increasing resources. This is why this type of examination does not 
work with CDP (all districts contested) and remains less clear with ADF/RDA (78.2 percent 
of districts contested). Still, the analysis recognizes different concentration strategies be-
tween the parties, particularly between the three smaller secondary parties. UPR has only 
one island stronghold as it concentrated its energy on fewer provinces and, therefore, often 
established several strongholds in one province with above-average results in surrounding 
districts (see Table 1). However, the party is not macroregionally concentrated since the six 
provinces in which it won its 11 strongholds are distributed over five administrative re-
                                                     
20  The limit is set at one local council seat won by the party in the same province but outside its stronghold(s). 
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gions, reaching from southwestern Hauts-Bassins to the Est region. UNIR/MS appears to 
form the opposite strategy pole with half of its strongholds being “islands” and none situ-
ated in above-average surroundings. Its ten strongholds are spread across eight provinces 
in seven regions. PDP/PS appears somewhere in the middle with 47.1 percent of its 17 
stronghold districts within below-average surroundings, plus five island strongholds and 
four strongholds in above-average surroundings. The party’s strongholds are also spread 
broadly across the country. 
Compared to the legislative ballot, PDP/PS is the only party which actively reduced the 
scope of its participation, from 29 to 20 provinces. UNIR/MS and UPR increased their in-
volvement from 23 to 43 and 17 to 32 provinces, respectively. This met with varying success; 
at best, with the acquisition of new strongholds (see Kourweogo for UPR). This is consistent 
with the institutional incentive for office-seeking party elites to expand electoral participa-
tion geographically since the electoral law provides for an additional national party list. Fif-
teen parliamentary seats are allocated according to the parties’ national vote share, which is 
determined by totaling all votes from those provinces in which a party presented a provin-
cial list. PDP/PS officials reported that they deplored the unintended decline, which 
emerged due to a failure of internal procedures. The party’s electoral loss was, thus, not a 
sign of strategic concentration—or even of macrosociological determination—but rather of 
organizational deficiency. The procedural difficulties even included the lack of a national list 
which the party president was supposed to head.21 ADF/RDA contested elections in all prov-
inces on both occasions. 
Relative to its investment, UPR achieved the greatest success. The party entered 71.4 percent 
of the local councils which they competed for and won double the number of seats of PDP/ 
PS and about four times the seats of UNIR/MS. UPR’s seat share averaged 22.2 percent 
wherever it entered a council, and—even more important for power relations—the party 
achieved absolute majorities in eight councils, giving them a ranking of second behind CDP 
among all Burkinabè parties. 
An important caveat should not be concealed: UPR belongs to the presidential movement 
and is thus close to the government. The work of opposition parties may be complicated and 
made more difficult due to the inchoate democratization of the political regime (see Stroh 
2008). However, even this should have an impact on relational voters with parochial inter-
ests who believe they will benefit more—in the short term—from closeness to government. 
This is, by the way, a plausible reason for the ongoing dominance of the presidential party 
CDP. However, the more nationalized ADF/RDA, which is even taking part in the cabinet, 
works significantly less efficiently. Interpreting UPR’s performance advance as a result of 
strategic decisions ceteris paribus is therefore justified. 
                                                     
21  Personal conversation with campaign managers at PDP/PS headquarters, Ouagadougou, May 2, 2007. 
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In sum, there is further evidence for the utility of a microbehavioral approach, since a 
macroregional approach would lead to the expectation of a stronger homogeneity of re-
gional—and, even more so, provincial—success patterns. However, the existence of island 
and non-island concentration of party performance already challenges structural ethnore-
gionalism. Still, without the theoretical underpinning which links the stronghold analysis to 
localized clientelism in the form of the “fils du terroir” leitmotiv, previous findings do not yet 
validate the approach’s utility to a fully satisfactory extent. 
Fourth Step: Benefits of “Fils du Terroir” 
The article aims to test the utility of a microbehavioral approach as a complementary alter-
native to structural determination. The approach emphasizes the human resources of politi-
cal parties. Without a doubt, other possible factors such as organizational failure (see PDP/ 
PS above), financial resources, or institutions may distort party decisions. Consequently, I 
continue to concentrate on the four secondary parties, further excluding CDP as its extensive 
financial resources and political dominance obstruct adequate testing. 
Following the logic of proximity, the most efficient option is for leading party personnel to 
campaign first and foremost within their home areas and to recruit capable candidates from 
there. An analysis of candidates and campaigns in all strongholds could be one way into the 
examination of the strategy. “Island strongholds,” for instance, should point to restricted re-
sources that had to be further concentrated. This requires data from deeper field work on 
these particular districts which is not currently available in a comprehensive manner. We 
thus have to content ourselves with another access path which reverses the logic of examina-
tion and looks at the effects of party leaders on their home districts. Does their personal 
proximity to local voters make a significant difference to a party? 
I identified the five to seven highest-ranking party officials22 for a correlation of human re-
sources and success balances. I then compared the individual places of origin (home dis-
tricts) with the party’s legislative and municipal strongholds. The leaders’ origins provide 
an initial insight into the party’s (non)interests: None of the leadership circles is exclusively 
composed of people from one specific region or ethnic group (cf. Table 3). Again, we find 
evidence which counters exclusive ethnoregionalism. However, the argument is that parties 
use candidates’ local affiliation, which may include a strong ethnic factor due to communi-
cation needs (campaign language) and enhanced trust (“one of us”). The significant differ-
ences from an ethnoregional approach are exclusiveness, policy aims, and political scope. 
Strict structuralism asks for an exclusive representation of macrosociological group interests. 
A strategy of localization is only about proximity to the parochial voter. It includes the po-
tential competition of candidates from various parties. 
                                                     
22  The number of officials depends on the internal structure of the respective party. 
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Table 3: Human Resources, Home District Election Results, and Strongholds of Selected 
Secondary Parties in Burkina Faso 
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ADF/RDA             
PP,  
Gilbert N. Ouédraogo 
Ouagadougou- 
Baskuy 
(Kadiogo) 
6.82 
below
NA 0 11 11 4.22 
below
NA 6.3 
below 
NA 
no, 
national 1 
HP,  
Gérard K. Ouédraogo 
Ouahigouya 
(Yatenga) 27.68 
strong-
hold 5 13 13 18.95 
well 
above
CA 
21.2 
well 
above 
CA 
no, 
retired 0 
VP,  
Diao M. Koné 
Banfora 
(Comoé) 
0.00 failed 0 5 9 0.00 failed 1.6 
below 
NA 
no 0 
SG,  
Fahiri J.F. Somda 
Zambo 
(Ioba) 
21.43 
strong-
hold 
0 6 8 1.59 
below
NA 
11.0 
above 
NA 
no 1 
HMP,  
Sidiki Ou Belem 
Djibo 
(Soum) 
3.23 
below
NA 
2 9 9 13.08 
above
CA 
16.1 
above 
CA 
no, 
Yatenga
1 
PDP/PS             
PP,  
Ali Lankoandé 
Fada- 
N’Gourma 
(Gourma) 
7.37 
above
CA 0 3 6 2.64 
above
NA 4.5 
above 
NA 
no, 
(national) 0 
HP,  
Joseph Ki-Zerbo (late) 
Toma 
(Nayala) 
6.52 
above
CA 
1 6 6 5.08 
above
CA 
2.0 
below 
NA 
no, 
late 
0 
HP/HMP,  
Th. S. Ouédraogo 
Boussouma 
(Sanmatenga) 
0.00 
not 
contested
1 1 11 4.08 
above
NA 
11.2 
strong- 
hold 
yes 1 
VP1,  
O. François Ouédraogo 
Yako 
(Passoré) 
0.00 failed 2 9 9 4.35 
above
NA 
7.1 
above 
CA 
yes 0 
VP2,  
Sébastien B. Zabsonré 
Tenkodogo 
(Boulgou) 
2.19 
above
NA 
1 9 13 1.81 
above
NA 
2.5 
above 
NA 
yes 0 
HPF,  
Etienne Traoré 
Bomborokuy 
(Kossi) 9.38 
well 
above
CA 
0 3 10 1.77 
above
NA 15.0 
strong- 
hold yes 1 
UNIR/MS             
Samba 
(Passoré) 40.43 
strong-
hold 1 9 9 8.42 
well 
above
CA 
13.3 
strong- 
hold 
no, 
national 1 
PP,  
Bénéwendé S. Sankara 
living Ouaga- 
Bogodogo 
(Kadiogo) 
15.63 
strong-
hold 1 7 11 1.15 
above
NA 15.7 
strong- 
hold 
no, 
national 2 
SN,  
Adama Dera 
Koudougou 
(Boulkiemde) 
0.00 failed 0 3 15 0.00 failed 2.1 
below 
NA 
no, 
national
0 
SN,  
Meng-Néré Kientega 
Samba 
(Passoré) 40.43 
strong-
hold 1 9 9 8.42 
well 
above
CA 
13.3 
strong- 
hold yes 1 
SN,  
Malick Sawadogo 
Nanoro 
(Boulkiemde) 
0.00 failed 0 3 15 0.00 failed 2.1 
below  
NA 
no,  
Kadiogo
0 
SN,  
Massadiamou Sirima 
Soubakanié- 
dougou 
(Comoé) 
0.00 
not 
contested 0 2 9 0.56 
below
NA 1.5 
below  
NA 
no,  
national 0 
SN,  
Fidèle Toé 
 
Toma 
(Nayala)** 0.00 
not 
contested 0 0 6 0.00 failed* 1.5 
below  
NA 
no,  
national 0 
SN,  
Alphonse Z. Tunya 
Yaho 
(Balé) 
75.00 
strong-
hold 
0 2 10 7.50 
above 
CA 
8.1 
strong- 
hold 
yes 0 
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UPR             
PP,  
Toussaints Abel  
Coulibaly 
Dédougou 
(Mouhoun) 40.66 
strong-
hold 0 7 7 11.64 
above 
NA 32.9 
strong- 
hold yes 1 
VP,  
Sébastien Ouédraogo 
Ouaga- 
Boulmiougou 
(Kadiogo) 
7.14 
above
NA 0 5 11 1.15 
below 
NA 
3.2 
below  
NA 
no,  
national 0 
SG,  
Yénignia Bangou 
Piéla 
(Gnagna) 
10.39 
above
NA 
2 7 7 19.23 
above 
CA 
14.1 
strong- 
hold 
yes 0 
SN,  
Saïdou L. Gouem 
“Pays Bissa” 
(Boulgou)*** 
79.55 
strong-
hold 
3 10 13 9.21 
above 
NA 
6.7 
above  
CA 
yes 1 
SN,  
Saïdou Kaboré 
Andamtenga 
(Kouritenga) 
58.18 
strong-
hold 
1 9 9 21.03 
above 
CA 
15.0 
strong- 
hold 
yes 1 
Key: PP = Party President  
HP = Honorary President  
VP = Vice President (1 = 1st, 2 = 2nd)  
SG = Secretary General 
SN = National Secretary  
HMP = Head of Party MPs  
HPF = Head of Party Faction  
CA = average of all contested districts/provinces  
NA = national average  
failed = contested, but no seat; not more than one additional seat outside the home district;  
contested, but less than 0.1% 
Notes: * FDS won 1 seat in Tome; Toé was FDS official until its merger with UNIR/MS shortly after the  
 2006 municipal elections   
** estimated [Y.B.]   
*** presumably Zabré [A.S.] 
Source: Author’s compilation on the basis of field research, using data from CENI Burkina Faso. Some informa-
tion has been completed with the help of Augustin Loada and Yacouba Banhoro, both from the Univer-
sity of Ouagadougou. 
Now, to what extent is the microbehavioral application of the “fils du terroir” strategy traceable? 
At the 2006 municipal polls, the selected parties won above-average seat shares23 in roughly 
half of the home districts of their leading representatives. Nine out of 23 home districts became 
party strongholds, including the rural homes of three party presidents.24 However, the parties 
failed to win seats in four home districts and three home districts were not contested. 
The opposition party UNIR/MS accounts for the largest number of failures and cases of 
nonparticipation in leaders’ home districts and their surroundings (a total of four). Party 
                                                     
23  That is, above the average seat share of all districts in which the party competed for seats. 
24  In the case of ADF/RDA, party president Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo was born and lives in Ouagadougou, 
which is not a stronghold of his party. However, his family is originally from Ouahigouya in northern 
Yatenga Province. Gilbert’s father, Gérard Kango Ouédraogo, who is the honorary president of the party and 
an ex-prime minister, still resides there. Therefore, this is commonly seen as his home district. 
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leaders explained to the author that they had to follow a strategy of concentration on the 
capital province Kadiogo, where most of the principal representatives live, and Passoré, 
which is the home province of the two highest-ranking party representatives, in both mu-
nicipal and legislative elections due to resource scarcity.25 Consequently, some of the lead-
ers’ home districts had to be neglected for the sake of resource efficiency. UNIR/MS opted 
for nonparticipation in the remote home districts of two national secretaries. On top of sav-
ing travel expenses, the decision was based on the fact that the respective provinces are re-
puted to be strongholds of competing parties. The nine municipalities of Comoé, for in-
stance, are characterized by a provincial two-party system. CDP and a smaller secondary 
party, namely Rassemblement pour le Développement du Burkina (RDB), which largely 
concentrates its activities in the southwest, ultimately shared 453 of 459 seats, with CDP ac-
counting for 63.2 percent and RDB for 35.5 percent of all local councilors in the province. 
While UNIR/MS didn’t even run candidates in this area, the home of national secretary Mas-
sadiamou Sirima, all candidates run by ADF/RDA failed, despite the fact that the party’s 
vice-president, Diao M. Koné, is a son of the soil. Such doubtful prospects can incite parties 
not to invest in campaigning—either through proactive nonparticipation or through less 
campaign spending.26 Thus, there is evidence that parties take complex strategic decisions 
which include the possibility of neglecting home districts under apparently unfavorable 
conditions. However, we need to allow for deviations from the rule because of poor strategic 
analysis and wrong party decisions. 
The legislative elections of 2007 serve as a test of additional evidence. A majority of electoral 
results from 23 home provinces of selected party officials support the strategy of localiza-
tion: 15 provincial outcomes exceeded the national average of the respective party. At the 
same time, ten out of 23 selected party officials led their home province’s electoral list. All of 
them achieved above-average results, with seven results qualifying as a party stronghold. 
Additionally, two of the selected officials led provincial lists other than those at their place 
of origin, with one province becoming a party stronghold (Kadiogo, UNIR/MS) and one 
achieving a result well above average (Yatenga, ADF/RDA27). 
                                                     
25  Interviews with Bénéwendé S. Sankara, president of UNIR/MS, November 2006 and May 2007, and Malick Y. 
Sawadogo, secretary national for organization and campaign coordinator of UNIR/MS, Ouagadougou, Octo-
ber 2006. 
26  However, data on the intensity of party campaigns in those home districts, where they ultimately failed to 
win seats despite their high level of “fils du terroir,” is not available. In other words, much more field research 
has to be done to determine whether parties strategically minimized their efforts or whether they were com-
petitively defeated. It is also unknown why PDP/PS totally concentrated on far-off Pensa in Sanmatenga 
Province while leaving Boussouma uncontested to CDP although the party’s honorary president, Théodore S. 
Ouédraogo, is the Naba Sonré, the traditional king of Boussouma. Again, research falls victim to data scar-
city. 
27  The head of the ADF/RDA’s parliamentary party, Sidiki Ou Belem, himself from the Sahel region, led the 
Yatenga list. However, the Yatenga Province is the home of ADF/RDA’s “grey eminence” and honorary 
president, Gérard Kango Ouédraogo, who is the father of today’s party president (cf. fn. 22). Being a minister, 
the latter, Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo, led the party’s national list, leaving the Yatenga stronghold to Sidiki Ou 
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Generally, a strategic concentration of all parties on the home provinces of their highest rep-
resentatives—thus, a strategy of localization—is measurable. The chance that one of the four 
selected secondary parties contested the municipal polls in one district which was part of a 
leader’s home province was 62.7 percent, while the nationwide likelihood was only 36.4 per-
cent. Again, UPR proves to have had the strongest concentration strategy with respect to the 
provincial level: 38 out of 70 contested districts belonged to the home provinces of UPR’s 
five leading representatives. This party competed for seats in 80.9 percent of the districts in 
home provinces, while their national engagement remained restricted to 19.6 percent of all 
districts. The concentration was lower for ADF/RDA (88.0 percent against 78.2 percent), 
PDP/PS (56.4 percent against 29.6 percent), and UNIR/MS (41.7 percent against 18.2 percent), 
but still ostentatious. 
There are only two cases of (near) island strongholds among the leaders’ home districts. In 
other words, concentration by the highest-ranking party officials on their home district 
only is rather rare. Spillover effects appear to be the rule. Yet, the two exceptions tell in-
structive stories. 
Alphonse Tunya, UNIR/MS, led the campaign within the region of Boucle du Mouhoun, 
which is virtually disconnected from transport infrastructure and where a scarcity of human 
and, reportedly, financial resources hindered UNIR/MS from contesting more than five out 
of 47 local councils.28 The strategic choice to concentrate on Tunya’s home district Yaho was 
successful. UNIR/MS won a 75 percent seat share in the municipal council, and Tunya be-
came the sole mayor of UNIR/MS. 
The other story took place in neighboring Kossi Province, where Etienne Traoré campaigned 
in his home district. Being rather a newcomer in PDP/PS, he has drawn his prominence from 
having been the supplementary candidate of late honorary president Joseph Ki-Zerbo in the 
2002 elections. In 2005, a considerable but still inadequate number of party members wanted 
Traoré to succeed Ki-Zerbo as party president. His takeover of the leadership of a reformist 
party wing in the same year further increased his intra-party importance and visibility: he 
criticized the elected party leadership but remained loyal to the party structures (Traoré et 
al. 2005).29 However, Traoré did not replace Ki-Zerbo in the national assembly until the lat-
ter’s retirement in August 2006, that is, after the municipal election. This and his controver-
sial role within the party probably restricted his resources. 
Nevertheless, Tunya and Traoré led the respective provincial lists in the 2007 parliamentary 
elections and managed to expand the provinces to party strongholds. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Belem, whose home province of Soum was not to be expected a safe electoral haven for institutional reasons 
(small two-seat constituency with a competing dominant party).  
28  Some additional UNIR/MS candidates were presented on joint opposition lists under the colors of the party 
Front des Forces Sociales (FFS). I draw my information about the state of the party in the Boucle du Mouhoun 
region from conversations with Gaston Bonkian, UNIR/MS, provincial party president of Mouhoun Province, 
Dédougou, November 2006, and Alphonse Tunya himself, Ouagadougou, August 2007. 
29  In between, Traoré did leave the party. 
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In sum, the findings support an approach which focuses on parties’ rationalized strategies of 
localization, based on resource efficiency and personal proximity, in Burkina Faso. The 
choice of the districts where a party participates in the municipal polls thus appears to com-
ply largely with a combination of four microbehavioral factors. First, a strategic confidence 
in the local spillover effects of honorable sons30 on neighboring districts. Second, the efficient 
concentration of restricted resources in order to avoid greater geographic distances. Third, 
the efficient mobilization of candidates and party workers through existing local social net-
works, including ethnic and linguistic linkages. Fourth, the strategic neglect of particular 
home districts due to intervening factors. The more a party deliberately commits to follow-
ing this rational logic, the better it performs at the polls. 
5 Conclusion: Theoretical Implications 
The deficiencies of macrosociological approaches to African party politics have necessitated 
research on alternative approaches. By adhering to the debate on personalization and clien-
telism on the one hand and to the rational decisions of collective actors on the other hand, 
this article has opted for a microbehavioral approach. A utility test using the example of 
Burkina Faso has supported a perspective on African party politics which emphasizes the 
rational decisions of party elites who follow a strategy of localized competition. 
Burkinabè parties obviously have campaign strategies which are adapted to their human 
and financial resources. Their primary goal appears to be the maximization of chances to 
win seats. Borrowing a familiar term, we may characterize them as being mainly office-
seeking parties. An important parameter for their strategy design is the “fils du terroir” prin-
ciple, which builds upon personal proximity to voters with basically parochial material in-
terests. A network of leading party officials (and presumably of other, less prominent “fils et 
filles du terroir”)31 concentrates on home districts and provinces. This is a pattern common to 
all parties under review and pays well, although to varying extents. Since the geographic 
distribution of strongholds is spread unsystematically across the country, it cannot be the re-
sult of ethnoregional structures, but, instead, of the localized advantages of party elite mem-
bers. Consequently, geographic concentration or dispersion is the results of deliberate elite 
decisions rather than the predetermined results of social structures. They are, thus, mainly 
the results of a rational strategy of localization. 
Though based on a certain range of plausible but not systematically tested assumptions, the 
empirical evidence of this article supports the utility of a microbehavioral approach and, 
                                                     
30  There are no women among the 23 selected officials. 
31  Due to data and expenditure restrictions, I could not test the human resource background of all candidates. 
Incidentally, this could provide for a very good opportunity for fruitful interdisciplinary research including 
social anthropologists and political scientists. 
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therefore, has several theoretical implications. Considering the exemplary character of the 
selected case study, the following theses ought to be examined through further research. 
First, the key mechanism of party politics in Africa might actually be rational decision mak-
ing, which means the localized mobilization of people with parochial interests, and not so 
much the structural mobilization of exclusive ethnoregional identities. Ethnic mobilization 
happens, but only within a confined space. Ethnic affiliation to a candidate is often a re-
source-efficient and comparably simple means of mobilization. However, if all parties rely on 
this strategy in overlapping areas of competition, it is not sufficient in explaining success. 
Second, decision makers at the top of the parties have the power to balance their organiza-
tions’ human and financial resources against several national and local context variables 
such as local social demography, infrastructural accessibility, electoral institutions, advan-
tages of incumbency, and the strongholds of other parties. 
Third, cleavages and open conflicts between ethnic groups are, independent from their 
genesis, reduced to ex ante incentives for party elites who decide whether they concentrate 
their mobilization on exclusive ethnoregional identities or not. Since it is hard to imagine 
that discrete parochial interests pose a serious threat, the main responsibility lies in the 
hands of the elites. 
Fourth, change becomes, ceteris paribus, more likely from a microbehavioral perspective than 
with socio-structural approaches which expect deeply rooted determinants of party politics. 
In other words, the behavioral approach—being a top-down approach—affects fewer people 
and decisions, while the structural approach—being a bottom-up approach—implies slow 
and difficult opportunities for change. 
Fifth, the more a party is centered around one individual “big man,” the more it becomes 
likely that the party is regionally concentrated in his home region in order to control the 
network and protect his self-interest. Coalitions of several “big men” can obviously bridge 
the ethnoregional dimension and overlap geographically with other parties’ zones of inter-
est in an unsystematic manner due to opportunity structures. Finally, divergence in party 
behavior underlines the fact that we need to think of African party systems in a less one-
dimensional manner. 
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Annex 
Table A1: Key Data on Selected Parties (in %) 
 Vote share  
National  
Assembly  
elections  
2002 
Seat share  
National  
Assembly  
 
2002 
Vote share 
presidential 
elections  
 
2005 
Share of  
voting  
intentions  
(survey  
2006) 
Vote share  
National  
Assembly  
elections  
2007 
Seat share  
National  
Assembly  
 
2007 
ADF/RDA 
12.6 15.3 
supported  
incumbent 
president 
6.2 10.7 12.6 
CDP 
49.5 51.4 80.3 68.6 58.9 65.8 
PDP/PS 
7.0 9.0 1.7 1.7 2.5 1.8 
UNIR/MS 
2.5 2.7 4.9 6.7 3.9 3.6 
UPR 
(registered  
in 2004) 
— — 
supported  
incumbent 
president 
0.4 4.3 4.5 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from CENI Burkina Faso (independent electoral commission) and a 
GIGA survey poll (October 2006, N=1,003). 
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Figure A1: Geographic Distribution of Seat Shares and Strongholds in the 2006 
Municipal Elections 
The following graphs report on an interim stage of research and may help to clarify the ar-
gumentation through visualization. In the absence of detailed maps, a two-dimensional co-
ordinates system per party indicates seat shares on the y-axis, while the x-axis covers all 358 
municipalities (third subnational level). Administrative regions (first subnational level) de-
termine the order of the municipalities on the x-axis, starting from the southwest and ad-
vancing to the northeast. The bold line indicates the lower stronghold margin, defined as 
double the average share of all councils contested by the respective party. In other words, 
each data point above the bold line represents a municipal council stronghold of the respec-
tive party as defined in this paper. The further up the position of the point on the vertical 
axis, the larger the party’s seat share. Geographically neighboring municipalities are also lo-
cated close to each other on the horizontal axis. The more the pattern of data points is scat-
tered, the less the party is regionally concentrated. 
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Notes: Detailed geographical allocation: Municipalities of the administrative region Cascades on positions 1-17; 
Sud-Ouest, 18-45; Hauts Bassins, 46-81; Boucle du Mouhoun, 82-128; Nord, 129-159; Centre-Ouest, 160-
197; Centre-Sud, 198-216; Centre (Ouagadougou), 217-227; Plateau Central, 228-247; Centre-Nord, 248-
275; Sahel, 276-301; Centre-Est, 302-331; and Est, 332-358. 
Source: Author’s representation based on data from CENI Burkina Faso (independent electoral commission) 
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Figure A2: Reference Map of Burkina Faso 
 
Source: Open internet resource (http://english.freemap.jp/, accessed on 1 July 2008). 
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